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Labour as a utility measure reconsidered 
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Abstract: 
In Stated Preference studies for the appraisal of environmental projects in poor countries or 
regions it often turns out that the stated willingness to pay of people for environmental 
improvements, which is used as measure of individual welfare changes, is very low. This is often 
interpreted as the result of extremely tight budget constraints, which make it impossible that 
people express their true appreciation of an environmental project in terms of their willingness to 
pay for it. Therefore, it is sometimes suggested to use labour contributions instead of money as 
a numeraire to measure utility in such studies. In this paper we show theoretically and empirically 
that this suggestion is not compatible with the principles of welfare theory because of several 
inconsistencies. We also illustrate the validity of our arguments empirically based on the results 
of a Contingent Valuation study conducted in a rural area in northern Vietnam. 
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1. Introduction 
Cost-benefit analysis is an important tool for supporting decisions on the rational use of public 
funds, especially in the environmental sector. It aims at the assessment of the social benefits 
generated by some environmental project in order to compare these benefits to the costs of the 
project or to the social benefits generated by other projects. Thereby it helps to substantiate the 
decision if an environmental project should be realized or not, and it may also help to pick the 
best from a variety of alternative projects. Hence, in this application environmental valuation is 
primarily an instrument to enhance the efficiency of public spending. One of the most popular 
methods for the economic valuation of environmental projects is the Contingent Valuation Method 
(CVM). It is an interview-based direct valuation technique aiming at the assessment of people's 
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for the realization of a public project (cf. Carson and 
Hanemann, 2005). 
In the course of a CVM survey, interviews with a representative sample of all households affected 
by a certain public project are conducted in order to elicit their willingness to pay for that project. 
The WTP is interpreted as the Hicksian Compensating Variation (HCV) for the project in question. 
The average WTP of the sample is multiplied by the number of all households affected by the 
project in question in order to determine its "social value" which equals the social benefits 
accruing from that project. The social benefits can then be compared to the costs caused by the 
project in order to determine if it is socially desirable in the sense of the Hicks-Kaldor social 
decision criterion or not (cf. Hicks, 1939 and Kaldor, 1939).  
However, the use of CVM is often considered problematic in countries where household incomes 
are very low and where subsistence economy prevails, so that a considerable part of households’ 
consumption is not bought in markets (see e.g. Gibson et al., 2016). Willingness-to-pay 
responses in Contingent Valuation studies in such countries are severely limited by tight budget 
constraints and by the fact that part of households' consumption is not paid for in terms of money. 
WTP is, therefore, not considered a good utility measure under such circumstances since the 
trade-off between private good consumption on the one hand and the consumption of a public 
good on the other, which forms the theoretical basis of the CVM, cannot be expressed adequately 
in terms of money or income under such circumstances (cf. Ahlheim, 1998).  
One suggestion often made in the literature is to use other measuring units than money, 
especially labour contributions (see e.g. Echessah et al., 1997; Hardner, 1996; Hung et al., 2007; 
Abramson et al., 2011; Vondolia et al., 2014; Lankia et al., 2014) or staple food (cf. e.g. 
Shyamsundar and Kramer, 1996) or beehives (Asquith et al., 2008) for the valuation of public 
goods. Instead of asking people how much money they would be willing to give up in order to 
obtain a certain public good it is suggested to ask how many working days or working hours they 
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would be willing to contribute to the provision of that good. Labour as a utility measure has been 
used not only in CVM studies but also in Choice Experiments (see e.g. Abramson et al., 2011; 
Rai and Scarborough, 2013; Gibson et al., 2016). In this paper we scrutinize the suggestion to 
use labour contributions to a public project instead of money as a payment vehicle in CVM studies 
under theoretical and empirical aspects. From the results of a CVM study conducted in a rural 
region in northern Vietnam we conclude that labour is not a suitable measuring rod for the utility 
people expect from an environmental project, since the relation (or "exchange rate") between 
one hour of labour and the disutility it causes is different not only between different individuals, 
but also for one and the same individual, depending on the specific circumstances under which 
the work has to be contributed. This relation depends on the kind of labour to be done (office 
work, different kinds of physical labour etc.), the opportunity cost of the time spent on the labour 
contribution (depending on the alternative uses of this time such as paid work, work in one's own 
business or farm, leisure etc.) and the kind of work an individual is used to from her everyday life 
and regular job. Therefore, the number of working days an individual is willing to contribute to a 
public project is not a reliable and uniquely defined indicator of the utility gain the individual 
expects from that project. Further, a conversion of labour contributions into monetary terms by 
multiplying working hours by an average wage rate, as is recommended in some publications, 
may not be appropriate in such poor regions since, typically, there exist no functioning labour 
markets in such areas. Only 7.5% of the respondents of our survey stated that they would have 
the possibility to do paid work instead of the community work for the public project. In our survey 
we ask respondents first to state their WTP in monetary terms, before we open up the possibility 
to contribute labour to the project, so that their WTP statement should refer to the total utility they 
expect from the project. We find that stated WTP accounts for less than one-tenth of a percent 
of respondents' incomes (0.08%) on average. Therefore, we do not find evidence for the 
assumption that people's "true" WTP for the environmental project in question was limited or 
truncated by their ability to pay. In most CVM surveys a stated WTP of about one percent or less 
of households' incomes is found, so that income does not seem to put a serious restriction on 
people's WTP for environmental projects (s. e.g. Wang et al., 2006; Boman et al., 2008; Yu and 
Abler, 2010 or Yang et al., 2014). In the light of such results the search for a payment vehicle 
alternative to money does not seem to be really necessary.  
In the next section we describe the problems arising in the context of CVM surveys in very poor 
societies from a theoretical point of view. Section 3 provides a short overview of the literature 
related to willingness to pay and willingness to work (WTW) in Stated Preference studies. In 
section 4 we discuss possibilities of how to handle the problem of tight budgets in poor societies 
in the context of Stated Preference studies. In section 5 we present an empirical study conducted 
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in Vietnam in order to test the usefulness and applicability of labour as a numeraire for measuring 
welfare, and in section 6 we discuss the results of this study. Section 7 contains some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. The problem 
The economic valuation of changes in environmental quality caused by a public project typically 
aims at the question whether or not society as a whole is better off after that project has been 
performed or not. Two steps are necessary to answer this question: first, individual welfare 
changes of all people potentially affected by the project in question have to be assessed and, 
second, these individual welfare changes must be aggregated in order to compute the resulting 
change in social welfare. For practical reasons these welfare changes should be assessed in 
monetary terms so that they can be compared to the costs of the public project in question.  
The first step of the appraisal of a government-financed environmental public project is, therefore, 
the assessment of the change in individual utility accruing to an individual j ∈{1, 2,..., J} from a 
change in environmental quality from z0 to z1 that is caused by that project:  
 
(1) ∆01 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  =  𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 1 − 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  0 =   𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗1 , 𝑧𝑧1)  −   𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗0 , 𝑧𝑧0) 
 
In (1) we describe the state of the environment by a vector z of parameters describing the state 
of environmental quality (air quality, water quality, ecosystem services etc.). The function uj(xj,z) 
is an individual j's (well-behaved) direct utility function, while Uj0 and Uj1 denote the utility levels 
attained by individual j before and after the project, and xj0 and xj1 are the market commodity 
bundles consumed before and after the project in question. Since the utility change ∆Uj cannot 
be observed empirically, we need an empirical utility indicator INDj fulfilling the following 
requirements: 
 
(2) In order to be used in Stated Preference studies an empirical indicator INDj (Uj0,Uj1) of 
individual utility changes ∆01Uj = Uj 1− Uj  0  should be 
 
a. computable on the basis of empirically assessable data, 
b. strictly monotonically related to utility changes according to  INDj (Uj0,Uj1)  ≥  0 ⇔ ∆01Uj   ≥  0    and  INDj (Uj0,Uj1)  ≥  INDj (Uj0,Uj1') ⇔ ∆01Uj   ≥   ∆01'Uj   , 
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c. measured in uniquely defined units to be suited for aggregation over individuals in 
a welfare theoretically meaningful way, 
d. convertible into monetary terms, so that it can be used in the cost-benefit 
comparison criterion for public investments.  
 
Requirement (2a) represents the crucial difference between IND and a normal utility function. 
(2b) requires that there exists a one-to-one relation between the indicator IND and the item it 
indicates, i.e. utility. IND should show a positive value if and only if an individual's utility level is 
raised by a public project and its value should increase with the level of utility that is produced by 
a public project, i.e. IND should not only indicate the direction of a utility change, but also its 
extent in a uniquely defined way. Requirement (2c) makes sure that the units in which IND is 
measured are the same for all individuals, so that the values of IND are comparable between 
individuals for aggregation and not arbitrary. Requirement (2d) is necessary for the use of IND in 
cost-benefit analyses, since the costs of a project are typically assessed in monetary terms.  
The standard utility indicator used in project appraisal studies, no matter if they employ Stated 
Preference methods like Contingent Valuation or Choice Experiments (CE) or Revealed 
Preference methods like the Travel Cost Method or Hedonic Pricing, is the Hicksian 
Compensating Variation  
 
(3) 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗01 =   𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�𝑝𝑝, 𝑧𝑧1, 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗1� − 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�𝑝𝑝, 𝑧𝑧1, 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗0�    � = 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗01 �     
 
where e(⋅) for given commodity prices p and given environmental quality z is what Samuelson 
(1979) called a money-metric utility function based on Lionel McKenzie's (1957) minimum 
expenditure function. It indicates the minimum expenditure necessary to attain a utility level U 
with commodity prices p and environmental quality z. The HCV according to (3) expresses, 
therefore, the maximum amount of money a consumer j can give up after environmental quality 
has been improved from z0 to z1 without being worse off in utility terms than in the initial situation 
0. For a rational consumer this amount equals her maximum willingness to pay to get this 
environmental improvement realised. For utility decreases (e.g. as a consequence of 
environmental damages) the HCV is, of course, negative and can be interpreted as a household's 
willingness to accept compensation for that damage. In this paper, however, we will focus on the 
appraisal of utility-increasing public projects.  
Using a household's indirect utility function vj(p, z, Ij) the idea of the willingness-to-pay concept 
can be expressed by the identity 
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(4) 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗�𝑝𝑝, 𝑧𝑧1, 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 −   𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗01 �   ≡   𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗�𝑝𝑝, 𝑧𝑧0, 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�  =   𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗0  
 
where market prices p and the household's lump-sum income Ij are assumed to be constant. 
Willingness to pay for a commodity as an indicator of the utility a consumer expects from the 
consumption of that commodity is a concept that people are acquainted with from their everyday 
lives. Therefore, (3) is suitable for the use in Stated Preference surveys where people are asked 
their WTP for the realization of a certain project, so that requirement (2a) is fulfilled.  Since the 
HCV is defined in monetary terms it also satisfies requirement (2d) by definition.  
From the strict monotonicity of the money-metric utility function in utility (cf. Weymark, 1985, 
p.221) it follows immediately that HCV fulfils also requirement (2b) for a given project: WTP is 
positive if and only if the respective public project leads to a utility increase and the amount of 
the WTP increases with the utility gain that is cause by that project. Aggregation of a utility 
indicator over different individuals is, of course, a conceptual challenge in the context of ordinal 
utility, since it implies a cardinal interpretation of the individual utility measures and the possibility 
of a trade-off between the utility changes of different individuals as in a social welfare function. 
In applied cost-benefit analyses, however, it is common to calculate the social benefits Bsocial 
accruing from an environmental project by simply adding up the individual WTPs over all 
individuals  
 
(5) 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  =   ∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗01𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1    �=   ∑ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗01 𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 �   . 
 
From a welfare theoretical perspective this amounts to defining a social welfare function where 
all individuals obtain the same social weights. The realization of a specific environmental project 
depends then on the comparison between the social benefits according to (5) and the project 
costs. According to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion (Hicks, 1939; Kaldor, 1939), a project is considered 
for realization only if the benefits exceed the costs. The dependence of the realization of a public 
project on Bsocial demonstrates the importance of the conceptual soundness of a welfare 
measure and of the validity and reliability of its empirical assessment.  
If we accept this idea of aggregation in principle, the question arises, under which conditions an 
aggregation procedure is meaningful under a welfare economic perspective according to 
requirement (2c). We find it necessary for a meaningful aggregation that the units, in which the 
welfare indicator IND is defined, are homogeneous for one and the same individual as well as 
between different individuals. Ideally, a dollar of stated WTP should be uniquely defined 
regarding the utility change it signifies for a single household, and it should also represent the 
same utility change for different households. For a single household the "currency" in which it 
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pays for a utility increase is uniquely determined in terms of its WTP. But if we accept the general 
notion of diminishing marginal utility of income, it is clear that the next dollar donated for an 
environmental project has different values in terms of utility for rich households on the one hand 
and poor households on the other. For them WTP is not a uniform "currency" in terms of utility. 
This fact is disregarded by the well-known "a-dollar-is-a-dollar" principle used in practical cost-
benefit analysis according to the aggregation procedure in (5).  
Since in most valuation studies WTP is assessed not on an individual but on a household level, 
it is, further, held that summing up individual WTP statements leads to a discrimination against 
poorer households, whose WTP is restricted by their budget constraint, i.e. by their ability to pay. 
Therefore, they have less "voice" to express their appreciation of an environmental project than 
richer households. Especially, when considering households with many household members, 
where more people will benefit from an environmental project than in single-person households, 
one would expect higher WTP statements. Contrary to this hypothesis many empirical studies 
yield results where stated WTP decreases with household size (see e.g. Whitehead, 1991; 
Whittington et al., 1992; McDaniels et al., 1992; Garrod and Willis, 1994; Johannesson et al., 
1996; Chambers et al., 1998; Hammitt et al., 2001; Dong et al., 2004; Aprahamian et al., 2007). 
Chambers et al. (1998, p.149) give the following explanation for their result of a negative influence 
of family size on WTP: “This result might be related to ability to pay; as family size increases, 
budgets tighten, and WTP falls”. Ahlheim and Schneider (2013), therefore, suggest to use 
household equivalence scales as weights in an aggregation process analogous to (5).  
The problem remains that in countries or regions where all households are poor, they might not 
be able to express their appreciation of an environmental project adequately in terms of WTP. In 
this case money does not seem to be an appropriate measuring rod for the utility people expect 
from a public project. This has consequences for the allocation of public projects within a country, 
if government has to decide which of several alternative public projects in different parts of the 
country should be realized. If some of these regions are rich and some are not, the social benefits 
in terms of stated WTP assessed in the rich regions will be higher than in the poor regions, and 
the public money will go to the rich regions where it seemingly creates higher benefits, while, 
probably, it would be more needed in the poorer regions.  
Another argument held against WTP as a utility measure is that in poor societies an important 
part of people's consumption often does not come from commodity markets but, instead, from 
the subsistence or barter economy (s. e.g. Gibson et al., 2016). In this case it does not hold that 
the utility from a household's consumption xj depends on income alone (for given p and z). 
Instead, the household's consumption bundle comprises also a "non-market" component that is 
not restricted by the household's budget constraint and, therefore, not affected by its payments 
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for environmental projects. However, this argument does not seem to harm the idea of WTP as 
a measure of individual utility, as long as at least a part of the household's consumption is paid 
for out of its budget and as long as the marginal utility of income is positive. In this case each 
dollar spent on a public project in terms of WTP stands for a consumption sacrifice and a loss in 
utility.  
Summing up, we can say that the Hicksian Compensating Variation or WTP according to (3) 
fulfils the requirements (2a, b and d), while aggregation over different individuals (2c) is 
problematic within the context of ordinal utility theory. Further, it is not clear how valuation studies 
should deal with the problem that in very poor regions of the world stated WTP for environmental 
projects is very small, so that the question arises, if under such circumstances WTP is a suitable 
welfare measure.  
 
3. Related Literature 
Since the early 1990s, the use of Contingent Valuation surveys to determine people’s willingness 
to pay in developing countries has become a common technique. Most of these studies focus on 
the empirical objective of assessing the social value of environmental projects without mentioning 
further methodological aspects. Only few attempts have been made to address the specific 
problems originating from different socio-economic, cultural and political circumstances that 
might complicate the conduction of CVM surveys in developing countries. In his 1998 and 2002 
articles, Whittington analyses specific problems faced by CVM researchers in developing 
countries and provides a systematic overview. 
One of the central aspects frequently discussed when it comes to Contingent Valuation studies 
especially in poor areas with households that live on the subsistence level, is the tight budget of 
respondents. Their budget constraint might hinder people to express their real appreciation of 
the project in terms of their WTP since they just do not have any money. Their appreciation for 
the project might however be substantial. In this context, Whittington (1998) categorizes the 
respondents in a CVM survey according to their willingness and their ability to pay. He states that 
only respondents who are willing and able to pay should be taken into consideration for the 
estimation of total benefits. According to his opinion, people who are willing but not able to pay 
should be categorized as “not willing to pay”. Following this suggestion would, however, result in 
very low average WTP statements since there would only be a rather small fraction of the overall 
population left that is able and willing to pay. To avoid this potential bias caused by tight budget 
constraints in poor regions, various solutions have been suggested. 
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As an alternative to money, payment vehicles such as in-kind payments, e.g. rice or beehives 
(Shyamsundar & Kramer, 1996; Asquith et al., 2008), or working days (Echessah et al., 1997; 
Hardner, 1996; Hung et al., 2007; Vondolia et al., 2014) have been suggested. 
Hardner (1996) was one of the first ones to use labour as a payment vehicle in CVM surveys. In 
his study, he assesses people’s willingness to work for potable tap water in a community in rural 
Ecuador. He finds that 72% were willing to contribute a positive amount of labour time for the 
construction of a water purification system (mean= 1.4 days). The comparison to WTP in 
monetary terms was, however, not possible in this subsistence agriculture-based community. 
In later studies, it became more common to simultaneously assess respondents’ contributions in 
terms of labour time and money (Swallow & Woudyalew, 1994; Echessah et al., 1997; Kamuanga 
et al., 2001). Each of the studies finds that respondents were rather willing to contribute labour 
time instead of money. However, the authors do not attempt to compare the two types of 
contributions in monetary terms; hence, contributions stated in labour time are not converted into 
monetary units. 
Hung et al. (2007) assess respondents’ WTP in terms of labour time for a forest fire prevention 
program in a small-scale study. By means of two payment cards, they elicit respondents WTP in 
monetary terms as well as in working days. To make the payment cards comparable, they 
multiply the working days by the current wage rate and thereby determine the monetary payment 
card intervals. They find that 81.4% are willing to contribute a positive amount of money while 
farmers are significantly less likely to state a positive amount. In terms of labour time, 90% are 
willing to contribute a mean of 5 working days per year. 
Casiwan-Launio et al. (2011) estimate the WTP in pesos per month and the WTW in days per 
month to maintain the San Miguel Island fishery reserve in the Bicol Region, Philippines, using 
the trichotomous choice question format after Loomis et al. (1999). To compare the two resulting 
estimates, they multiply the WTW estimates by 33% of the average daily income of the 
respondents, assuming this to be the opportunity cost of labour. They find that the WTW is 
approximately eight times higher than the lower-bound WTP estimate. To explain this divergence, 
they consider that missing labour markets reduce the opportunity cost of time or that respondents 
are more likely to forgo future income (with regard to contributing labour time) than income 
already earned due to the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980). 
Vondolia et al. (2014) compare WTP (money) and WTW (working time) of an open-ended CV 
format focussing on the experience that respondents have with the different payment vehicles in 
a CVM study among Ghanaian farmers. According to their results, more experience leads to 
lower response asymmetries between money and time suggesting that respondents’ experience 
with the payment vehicle should be considered when conducting CVM surveys in poor regions. 
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Vásquez (2014) investigates the two different payment vehicles in a context of municipal and 
community-managed water service systems in Guatemala by means of a sequential CV survey. 
He finds that respondents served by municipal services are substantially more willing to pay for 
safe drinking water in terms of money and labour than respondents served by community-
managed services are.  
While most of these studies elicit WTW as a single point measure, Pondorfer and Rehdanz (2015) 
elicit a WTW- and WTP-range in order to assess uncertainty of people’s willingness to work or to 
pay. They conclude that uncertainty decreases when people are asked for a contribution in labour 
time instead of money.  
The concept of willingness to work is also applied with other Stated Preference methods such as 
Choice Experiments. Abramson et al. (2011) investigate the willingness to pay, to borrow (WTB) 
and to work for water service improvements in a CE in rural Zambia. The authors introduce 
microfinance to enhance the WTP of the respondents in their experiment in order to circumvent 
problems with the ability to pay. Hence, respondents were able to choose between three payment 
vehicles: cash, interest-free loan or labour. They compare the results of the three vehicles (labour 
converted at the local wage rate for unskilled labour) and find their hypothesis confirmed that 
loan and labour financing yield higher estimates for water service improvements than WTP in 
cash.  
Gibson et al. (2016) implement a split-sample CE in Kandal Province, Cambodia, to test labour 
and money contributions as payment vehicles for improved drinking water focussing on e.g. 
attribute non-attendance. Their results suggest that, as long as functioning labour markets exist, 
the internal opportunity cost of time is similar to the local wage rate for similar labour tasks. In 
addition, there is no difference in non-attendance of the payment vehicle. They argue that it is 
not the type of payment vehicle that leads to non-attendance of the payment attribute but the 
payment vehicle itself. 
The wide acceptance of contributing labour time in CVM and CE studies suggests that exclusively 
asking for WTP in monetary terms will undervalue the benefits from the goods in question. The 
use of labour time as a measure of individual utility changes, however, also bears some 
problems. In contrast to money, working time is not a homogeneous good; it might thus have 
different values depending on the time and place where it is carried out. In practice, many studies 
simplify the problem by applying the average wage rate as the value of one working hour (see 
Hung et al., 2007; Abramson et al., 2011; Casiwan-Launio et al., 2011). Furthermore, in these 
studies the working conditions (time, place, kind of work) are usually not clearly defined. While 
avoiding the tight-budget bias, the use of labour as a numeraire can thus produce two other 
biases: one is due to imprecise specifications of the work to be done and the other originates 
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from the problem of converting stated labour contributions into monetary terms in order to be 
able to include them in a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
4. Discussion of different payment vehicles   
While it seems plausible, that under very austere living conditions people have more pressing 
problems than environmental preservation, so that a low stated WTP mirrors their true 
preferences given their actual situation, many authors, nevertheless, believe that poor people's 
true preferences towards public projects cannot be adequately expressed in terms in WTP. As 
discussed in the previous section they suggest to use payment vehicles different from money to 
give poor households the opportunity to express their preferences regarding the environment 
adequately. Three main suggestions are made in the literature in this context. One suggestion is 
that respondents should state their WTP in terms of hypothetical cuts in government expenditures 
which they consider equivalent from a utility point of view to the environmental improvement in 
question (cf. Bergstrom et al. 2004). In this version respondents in Contingent Valuation studies 
"pay" for an environmental improvement in terms of a reduction of public expenditures on other 
(already existing) public goods or services. This idea is very appealing at first sight, since 
respondents' personal incomes are not affected by this "payment", so that their WTP is not 
restricted by their tight household budgets. An important problem arising in this context is that, 
typically, it cannot be defined uniquely in a CVM interview which public goods or services will be 
reduced in order to finance the environmental project in question and to what extent this will 
happen. If a respondent in a CVM interview is willing to pay 50€ out of his budget for the 
preservation of a rare species, he knows what he gives up in terms of his private consumption 
and what the consequences for his wellbeing or utility are. But if, on the one hand, he does not 
know which public expenditures will be reduced, he cannot assess the ensuing reduction of his 
personal utility and, therefore, he cannot compare it to the utility gain expected from the 
environmental project in question. If, on the other hand, he is told which specific public good or 
service will be reduced in order to finance the environmental project, this "currency" will have 
completely different values in terms of utility for different people, so that requirement (2c) will be 
fundamentally violated. If somebody does not have children he does not care if subsidies for 
kindergartens are cut back, and if he does not have a car he does not mind if expenditures for 
road construction are reduced. Analogous arguments hold for museums, theatres etc. This 
means that different people would understand different things by a certain cut in public 
expenditures and they would associate different utility losses with it, so that their "willingness to 
cut public expenditures"-statements could not be aggregated or traded off against each other. 
Therefore this idea has to be dismissed on theoretical grounds.  
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Another suggestion for a numeraire different from money is to express one's WTP in terms of an 
essential and very common commodity or basic food, e.g. rice. This approach was followed by 
Shyamsundar and Kramer (1996) in their already mentioned CVM study where they assessed 
people's WTA for a restricted access to the Mantadia National Park in eastern Madagascar in 
terms of baskets of rice. It is rather obvious that this measurement method does not work in a 
WTP context: if people are really living close to the subsistence level (which is our assumption 
here), then they can give up neither money nor rice in order to enhance environmental quality. 
Therefore, using rice as a numeraire does not solve the problem of tight budgets. Additionally, 
since rice can easily be converted into money the question arises why one should ask WTP in 
terms of rice first and then convert it into money later. The same kind of argument holds for other 
in-kind payment vehicles as beehives (s. Asquith et al. 2008).  
While the non-monetary payment vehicles discussed so far appear unsuited for solving our 
problem, several studies suggest to use labour contributions as a numeraire for poor households' 
WTP for public projects, as discussed above in section 3. In these studies households are not 
asked how much money they are willing to pay for a public good but, instead, they are asked 
how many working days they would be willing to contribute to enable the provision of this good 
(cf. e.g. Hardner 1996, Echessah et al. 1997, Hung et al. 2007, Vondolia et al., 2014, Lankia et 
al., 2014). While some of these studies rely on the valuation in terms of labour only, others give 
respondents the possibility to state their contributions in terms of labour and / or money (cf. Hung 
et al., 2007; Abramson et al., 2011; Casiwan-Launio et al., 2011; Gibson et al. 2016).   
In order to consider this suggestion in detail, assume a household j has an overall time budget 
of T hours which can be used either for leisure Lj or for paid work Wj in the labour market or for 
working in the household's own business or farm Bj. The household's overall income consists 
then of a lump-sum income Ij plus labour income w∙ Wj plus income from the work in the 
household's own business rj∙Bj, where w is the wage rate and rj is the individual monetary return 
per working hour in household j's own business, i.e. the monetary value of the marginal product 
of this work. It is clear that rj depends on the individual circumstances of the household's business 
or farm like the fertility of the soil, the technical equipment etc. Therefore, rj will be different for 
different households.   
A household's utility maximization problem is then restricted by its overall income Yj and the 
overall time T available for leisure or different kinds of work:   
 
(6)  (a)   𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗    ;     (b)  𝑊𝑊 = 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 + 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗 + 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 
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From this presentation it becomes obvious that the financial equivalent of an hour of work 
dedicated to a public environmental project instead of a financial contribution, i.e. instead of WTP, 
depends on which kind of activity (leisure, paid work, own work) will be cut back in favour of the 
public work. Therefore, the value of an hour of public work in terms of its opportunity cost will 
differ from household to household. Also for one and the same household it will differ according 
to the actual situation, in which the work has to be delivered. If this happens to a farmer during 
the harvest season his monetary opportunity cost per community working hour will be rj. If he 
misses paid work, his opportunity cost per community working hour would be the wage rate w. 
The monetary opportunity cost of leisure is zero. Here the individual loses utility in terms of the 
marginal utility of leisure, while in the other two cases he loses utility in terms of reduced market 
good consumption caused by the implied loss of income. The same number of working hours 
(WTW) will, therefore, stand for different utility equivalents, so that requirement (2b) for a reliable 
utility indicator will be violated by WTW as a payment vehicle.  
The uncertainty regarding the alternative use of communal working time leads us to the 
hypothesis that it is not possible to convert the working hours an individual is willing to contribute 
to the provision of an environmental project into monetary units, as long as we do not know what 
people would do during those hours, otherwise. Even if we had this information, neither the 
monetary value of leisure nor the value of the marginal product of an individual's work on his farm 
etc. would be known. This implies a violation of our requirement (2d) above.  
In practical CVM studies the problem of converting labour into money is often "solved" by simply 
multiplying the working hours offered by CVM respondents by some average wage rate (Hung et 
al., 2007; Abramson et al., 2011; Casiwan-Launio et al., 2011). Obviously, this makes sense only 
if respondents really have the possibility to earn this wage rate during the time they offer as WTW 
for the public good, so that the average wage represents the opportunity costs of their work 
contribution to the public good. Typically this will not be the case, since there exist no functioning 
labour markets in remote rural areas of developing countries and since many people there will 
be farmers or self-employed in their own businesses.  Therefore, the average wage rate is 
meaningless to them. The valuation of time is more sophisticated, especially, since time can be 
used for various different activities which have different relations to utility, as we have explained 
above. This is also shown e.g. by Dalenberg et al. (2004) in a Contingent Valuation study where 
they show that time can have different values to a person depending on which activity is 
undertaken. A fundamental theoretical model on how to value time in which different dimensions 
of time are considered was constructed by Becker (1965).  
It should be mentioned in this context that in empirical valuation studies it is often assumed for 
simplicity's sake that the only opportunity cost of community work for some environmental project 
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is a loss of leisure time. Based on this assumption people's WTW for a public project is often 
defined in analogy to (4) as 
 
(7) 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗�𝑝𝑝, 𝑧𝑧1, 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗, 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 − 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗01 �   ≡   𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗�𝑝𝑝, 𝑧𝑧0, 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗, 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗�  =   𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗0   . 
 
Considering the different possible uses of time, this kind of modelling is obviously misleading (cf. 
e.g. Eom and Larson (2006), Vondolia et al. (2014), or Gibson (2016)).  
We should, further, note that the utility equivalent of a working hour is only incompletely captured 
by the pure loss of time (as in (7)), since work itself has a direct influence on utility. This is an 
important difference between money and working hours. While money is a mere medium of 
exchange, labour may cause different degrees of disutility depending on the kind of work, hard 
or light physical work, brain work etc. Therefore, people's willingness to work for an environmental 
project is not even for one and the same household a uniform measuring rod for utility, as required 
in (2b), as long as the kind of work to be contributed to a public project is not uniquely specified. 
But even then it is not comparable between different households, because the disutility a specific 
kind of work causes depends, among other things, on the kind of work the respective individual 
is used to from his everyday life, his age, health status etc.  Aggregation of working hours across 
households according to some "an-hour-is-an-hour" principle will, therefore, not be possible, so 
that also our requirement (2c) is violated by WTW as a payment vehicle in Stated Preference 
studies. Our respective hypothesis for our empirical study is that in Stated Preference surveys 
people make differences in their WTW statements for the same project depending on the kind of 
labour they have to contribute (H1).  
Further, we think that the utility sacrifice a household is willing to make in terms of working hours 
for an environmental project depends on the kind of work the household is used to from his 
everyday life. Physical work means more disutility for somebody, who works in an office than for 
a farmer or a construction worker. Hence, our hypothesis here is that stated willingness to do a 
specific kind of work depends on the kind of work people are used to from their everyday jobs 
(H2).  
Additionally, if the alternative uses of the time people are willing to spend on communal work for 
the public project are not homogeneous (i.e. only paid labour or only leisure) but different for 
different persons and occasions, then the monetary value per hour of their WTP is also not 
uniquely determined (H3), especially since we do not know the monetary value of leisure time or 
time spent in one's own business or farm. Then it is pointless to compare or aggregate the WTW 
of different people with different life backgrounds because their work contributions stand for 
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totally different opportunity costs or utility sacrifices. By testing hypotheses (H1) to (H3) 
empirically we want to find out if WTW is a suitable alternative to WTP in poor societies.  
Summing up, we suppose that requirements (2) for a reliable empirical measure of individual 
utility changes are not fulfilled by WTW. The utility equivalent of individual labour contributions is 
not uniquely determined (violation of (2b)), because it depends, among other things, on the kind 
of communal work that has to be done by that individual (together with his age, health, the 
weather on that specific day etc.) and on the kind of work that this individual is used to from his 
normal job and everyday life. Since there exists no one-to-one relation between WTW and 
individual utility changes, a welfare economically meaningful aggregation of WTW over different 
individuals is not possible (violation of requirement (2c)). A conversion of WTW into monetary 
terms (requirement (2d)) would be meaningful in a welfare economic sense if there was only one 
alternative use of the time contributed to communal work (e.g. paid private labour) and if there 
was a uniform monetary value of this time use (e.g. a wage rate). If there are different possibilities 
of an alternative use of the time contributed to communal work (depending on the specific 
personal situation when the communal labour has to be done) and if there is no uniform monetary 
value of the different time uses (like leisure or work in one's own business) it is not possible to 
assess the opportunity cost of the time contributed to communal work in a welfare theoretically 
meaningful way, so that (2d) is violated.   
In our CVM study conducted in a rural area in northern Vietnam we tested the hypotheses that 
people's stated willingness to work for the realization of a public project depends 
 
(H1) on the kind of labour required,  
(H2) on the kind of work people are used to from their usual jobs and their everyday lives 
and  
(H3) that the opportunity cost of the contributed labour as a monetary measure of people's 
WTW cannot be determined unambiguously.  
 
If hypotheses (H1) and (H2) will be confirmed in our empirical study, requirement (2b and c) for 
a reliable empirical utility measure are violated, if (H3) is confirmed requirement (2d) will be 
violated. In the next chapter we briefly describe the main features of our CVM survey.  
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5. An empirical study 
The research site for our survey in northern Vietnam is Yen Chau district in the Son La province 
located about 250 kilometres west of Hanoi. Every year between June and September heavy 
rainfalls in these regions lead to an increase in the frequency and severity of landslides and the 
destruction of fields, buildings and infrastructure. In June 2015, in the wake of Tropical Cyclone 
Kujira, torrential rain caused flash flooding in the northern province of Son La, Vietnam, which 
was the study site of the research project underlying this paper. Landslides occur in the steeply 
sloped agricultural areas where sometimes entire farming fields are washed downhill. 
Consequently, people in landslide-prone areas suffer in many ways: substantial numbers of 
people lose their homes, road blockings and destruction severely impair the transportation of 
people and merchandise for various days or weeks. Some people even lose their lives due to 
landslides. The National Road No. 6 from Hanoi to Son La, which leads through Yen Chau, is 
especially endangered by landslides during the rainy season.  
Against this background a CVM study was conducted in Yen Chau district where the main areas 
endangered by landslides are situated. A survey with personal interviews of 500 randomly 
selected households of villages located along National Road No. 6 in Yen Chau district was 
conducted in April 2008. In these interviews respondents were first asked how much money they 
would be willing to contribute in the form of a mandatory landslide prevention fee in order to get 
this program realized. For this elicitation question the payment card format was chosen. After 
having asked people their WTP for landslide protection in terms of money we asked them if they 
were willing to contribute working time to the realization of this project in addition to the money 
contribution they had just offered. We asked the WTP question first, because we wanted to find 
out if people's stated WTP for the landslide protection program would really be so high that one 
could reasonably assume it to be truncated by their ability to pay. Letting them express their 
appreciation of the landslide protection program in terms of WTW alone, would not have been 
advisable since their time budgets are rather tight as well. Due to the low degree of mechanisation 
in agriculture in those areas, farmers (65% of the population), but also craftsmen and other 
workers have long working hours and harsh working conditions, so that after work they are 
exhausted and not much time is left for additional community work for the public project. 
Therefore, WTW as the only payment vehicle would not have led to a comprehensive valuation 
of our public project. Almost 85 % of the respondents answered ‘yes’ to the question if they were 
willing to contribute labour in addition to money. This was a prerequisite of our intention to test 
the suitability of labour as a numeraire for measuring households’ appreciation of a public project.  
If it turns out that labour contributions are not a uniform yardstick of utility in the eyes of those 
who make these contributions, but that their utility equivalent depends on the specific objective 
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(kind of labour) and subjective (personal job experience) circumstances, under which these 
contributions are made, it means that WTW is a much more subjective and more arbitrary utility 
gauge than monetary WTP and, therefore, should not be used as a numeraire in CVM studies. 
This will be the case, if in our survey statistically identical treatment groups state different mean 
WTW contributions for the same utility gain, i.e. for the same environmental project, depending 
on the kind of labour they have to contribute (H1) and the kind of labour they are used to (H2). If 
it turns out that the opportunity cost of labour contributions cannot be assessed unambiguously 
in monetary terms according to hypothesis (H3), a meaningful comparison of costs and benefits 
accruing from a public project is not possible on the grounds of WTW.  
In order to test (H1) we designed two different payment scenarios in terms of labour contributions, 
one "hard work" scenario and one "light work" scenario, which were presented to two different 
split samples of 250 households each in our CVM survey in rural Vietnam:  
 
"Light work" scenario (Split 1): "If you were employed as part of a working group planting trees 
on hilltop areas in Yen Chau district and if the organization of the works allowed you to choose 
the days of your personal working contribution at your convenience, how many working days 
would you be willing to contribute?" 
 
"Hard work" scenario (Split 2): "If you were employed as part of a working group constructing 
protection walls along the roads in Yen Chau district and if the organization of the works required 
that you have to be available whenever necessary (which might happen also during seeding and 
harvesting time), how many working days would you be willing to contribute?" 
 
With these different labour scenarios we wanted to find out if WTW for landslide protection 
depends on the kind of work scenario presented to the respondents of the two separate split 
samples. If this turns out to be true, hypothesis (H1) holds, hence, WTW does not constitute a 
homogeneous indicator of utility like WTP. 
Hypothesis (H2) implies that the (dis)utility equivalents of labour contributions by people with 
different skills and work experience from their normal job backgrounds are different, so that the 
usual "a dollar is a dollar"-aggregation rule according to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion cannot be 
applied to labour contributions. Therefore, aggregation in the sense of requirement (2c) would be 
problematic, to say the least, if (H2) turned out to hold. To test hypothesis (H2) we include a 
question in our questionnaire, where we ask respondents their everyday jobs.  
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Hypothesis (H3) was tested by asking respondents subsequent to the WTW question to indicate 
what they would do alternatively to contributing work to the landslide and flood protection 
program. These and some other results of our survey are discussed in the next section. 
 
6. Results and discussion 
Selected characteristics of the survey population 
Since Yen Chau is a rural area it is not surprising that 65% of the interviewed households are 
farmers (another 15% are self-employed and most of the rest (12.2%) are officials) with a rather 
low level of education (less than 25% have finished high school or higher educational degrees). 
Since the farmers live at least partly on a subsistence level the total average annual income is 
rather low reaching an average of 28 million VND (about 1750 USD) 7. Most of our interviews 
were conducted with Black Thai people (68.4%) which are the major ethnic group in that area. 
Although in the rest of Vietnam most people belong to the ’Kinh’ ethnicity, in Yen Chau district 
they constitute a minority. In our survey 30.8% of the interviews were conducted with Kinh, only 
4 interviews were conducted with other ethnic groups, like Muong and Kho Mu. 
 
Willingness to pay and its determinants 
For the estimation of WTP we used an interval regression model. (cf. Haab and McConnell, 
2002). From this model, a mean WTP for the proposed program of 24,353 VND (about 1.52 USD) 
is estimated (the 95% confidence interval estimated by the bootstrap approach by Park et al. 
(1991) ranges from 20,172 to 28,533 VND). It should be noted here, that when answering the 
WTP question respondents did not know that, afterwards, they would be asked to state their 
additional WTW for the landslide protection project. So, the amount stated here should represent 
their total WTP for the project at the moment when they were asked. The average WTP of 24,353 
VND corresponds to less than one per mill (0.08 percent) of the average income. It does not 
seem plausible that under these circumstances respondents' WTP statement had been restricted 
or truncated by their ability to pay. This holds also for other Stated Preference studies which 
found very low shares of income as WTP for public projects (cf. e.g. Wang et al. 2006; Boman et 
al. 2008 or Yang et al. 2014).  
                                               
7  At an exchange rate of 1 USD = 16,000 VND in April 2008 this equals app. 1.47 USD. 
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In a next step, a regression model with explanatory variables expected to systematically influence 
stated WTP was estimated. Table 1 gives an explanation and some descriptive statistics of these 
variables.8 
 
Table 1: Description of variables used in the regression models 
Variable Description Mean S.D. 
PROBLEM Indicates whether respondent considers 
landslides as a problem that needs to be 
redressed by extra efforts (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
0.79 - 
SEVERE Respondent rating of severeness of the 
damages suffered in 2007 (1 = not at all, 
4 = very severe)  
2.75 0.882 
REPAIR_MONEY Amount of money expended to repair 
personal damages due to landslides in 2007  
1 – 10 Mio. 
VND 
- 
REPAIR_WORK Amount of working time in days expended to 
repair personal damages due to landslides in 
2007  
2 - 7 - 
WORRY Rating of being worried about landslides in the 
future (1 = not at all, 4 = very worried) 
3.39 0.699 
COMPARE Judgment of own economic situation as 
compared to others (1 = much worse, 
4 = much better) 
2.49 0.596 
WORKDAYS Number of workdays respondents are willing 
to contribute to the realization of the project 
3.71 4.115 
HAPPY Rating of approval of the statement that 
nature is important for contributing to human 
happiness and to a high quality of life (1 = not 
at all, 5 = very much) 
4.86 0.385 
SATIS Rating of the satisfaction level regarding 
personal life situations, e.g. health, job, 
household income (1= completely unsatisfied, 
5= completely satisfied) 
3.20 0.799 
                                               
8   Many of the possible explanatory variables were found to be correlated. In order to avoid collinearity in 
the regression model, the selection of variables to be included in the model was determined by using 
factor analysis for selecting the variables with the highest capacity to include all the variables from a 
given correlated cluster. 
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PROTEST Indicates if a respondent has severe doubts in 
the program and if collected money will be 
only spent on landslide protection (1 = yes, 0 
= no) 
0.083 - 
MALE Indicates if a respondent is male (1 = yes, 0 = 
no) 
0.67 - 
INCOME Level of income 27.8 Mio 
VND 
16 Mio 
VND 
EDU Level of education (scale from 1 to 7) 2.80 1.343 
HARD_WORK Indicates if respondent was part of the “hard 
work” split (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
0.498 - 
DAM_FARM Indicates how many times respondent has 
personally experienced damage to farming 
fields or animals (1 = not at all, 5 = eleven to 
fifty times) 
2.173 0.741 
FARMER Indicates if respondent works as a farmer (1 = 
yes, 0 = no) 
0.715 - 
OFFICIAL Indicates if respondent works in government 
official or similar (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
0.100 - 
PUB_WORK Indicates if a member or a household has 
participated in public work to repair damages 
before (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
0.733 - 
LEISURE Indicates if respondent only loses leisure time 
when contributing working time (1 = yes, 0 = 
no) 
0.268 - 
NOPAY Indicates if respondent cannot perform paid 
work when contributing working time, hence 
loses money (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
0.058 - 
FARMDIFF Indicates if respondent faces difficulties with 
own business/ farm when contributing 
working time (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
0.633 - 
CHILDREN Number of children 2.69 1.935 
ETHNIC Ethnicity of respondents (1 = kinh, 0 = ethnic 
minorities) 
0.248 - 
 
The regression results in table 2 show that a number of variables have a significant effect on 
WTP in our study, most of the estimated influences are immediately plausible. The more a 
respondent is worried about landslides (variable: WORRY) and the harder his household had 
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been hit by the last flooding event (REPAIR_MONEY) the higher is his WTP. It is also no surprise 
that WTP increases with household income (INCOME).  
 
Table 2: Determinants of willingness to pay (Interval regression) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error Significance (p-value) 
CONSTANT -62889.580** 30714.400 0.041 
PROBLEM -3733.323 5272.638 0.479 
SEVERE -4738.387 2951.983 0.108 
REPAIR_MONEY 3684.759* 1923.187 0.055 
REPAIR_WORK 1099.776 1663.746 0.509 
WORRY 8074.692** 3378.142 0.017 
COMPARE 6866.266 4260.045 0.107 
HAPPY 6082.879 5584.349 0.276 
SATIS -2096.820 3029.095 0.489 
MALE 4527.107 4800.589 0.346 
INCOME 3358.648* 1957.146 0.086 
EDU 1180.827 1810.431 0.514 
ETHNIC -6722.301 5604.286 0.230 
Observations 400   
Log-Likelihood -1334.113   
χ2-statistics 30.53 (df=12)  0.002 
***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, respectively 
 
After their WTP statement we asked respondents whether in addition to their monetary 
contribution they would be willing to contribute some of their time to work on the implementation 
of the landslide protection measures (variable WOULDWORK). Almost 85 % of the respondents 
agreed to that question. Those who had agreed were explained the specific conditions under 
which they would have to contribute their working time (“hard work” or “light work”) and then they 
were asked how many working days at maximum they would be willing to contribute to the project. 
Considering that they would have to be transported to the working site and back home after work 
and considering the road conditions in that region it would not have been plausible to ask them 
to contribute single working hours.  
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To test our hypothesis H1 we analyse whether respondents' willingness to work, i.e. the working 
days they are willing to contribute to the implementation of the program, differs significantly 
between the specific work scenarios mentioned above, i.e. whether they have to contribute "hard" 
or "light" work. Table 3 shows that the average "hard work" contribution is 3.02 days while the 
average "light work" contribution is 3.99 days. The difference between the two average WTW 
statements is significant at the 5% level (p-value 0.024). This result confirms our hypothesis (H1). 
It shows that measuring people’s appreciation of a public project in terms of labour contributions 
is indeed context-dependent, just as we expected. 
 
Table 3: Differences in willingness to work between the different work scenarios (hard vs. 
light) 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
How many working days would 
you be willing to contribute? 
light work 249 3.99 4.609 0.292 
hard work 250 3.02 3.200 0.202 
 
 
 
 
 
***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, respectively.  
 
In order to investigate further factors that determine both the decision to contribute labour in 
principle (WOULDWORK) and the specific number of working days to be contributed (WTW) we 
made use of a two-step estimation procedure to model both decisions jointly. This is necessary 
since in our survey the answer to the WTW-question is contingent on the answer to the question 
whether the household would in principle be willing to contribute labour in addition to a monetary 
amount. The generic structure of such a two-step decision can be modelled by a Heckman 
sample selection model (cf. Heckman 1979, Greene 2003) according to:   
 
 
 
WMW test – Comparison of WTW “hard work” and 
“light work” splits 
  Hard work Light work p-value 
WORKDAYS 3.024 3.990 ** 0.024 
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𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 =  𝜷𝜷′𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊 +  𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠       (outcome equation) 
𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠
∗  =  𝜶𝜶′𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊 + 𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠       (selection equation) 
𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠∗ > 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠 = 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠∗ ≤ 0  
𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠 , 𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 ~ 𝑁𝑁[0,0, 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2, 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2, 𝜌𝜌]  
 
The vector xi denotes the explanatory variables of the outcome equation, i.e. in our case WTW, 
and wi denotes the explanatory variables of the selection equation, i.e. in our case the decision 
whether to contribute labour in principle or not. The expected value of WTW given that it is 
observed can then be expressed as 
 
𝐸𝐸 [𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠  |𝑧𝑧∗ > 0] = 𝜷𝜷′𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊 +  𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀  𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 (− 𝜶𝜶′𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢⁄ ) 
 
where  λi (− 𝛂𝛂′𝐰𝐰𝐢𝐢 σu⁄ ) = ϕ (𝛂𝛂′𝐰𝐰𝐢𝐢 σu⁄ ) Φ (𝛂𝛂′𝐰𝐰𝐢𝐢 σu⁄ )⁄  denotes the inverse Mill’s ratio and ρ stands 
for the correlation coefficient between εi and ui. Estimating this equation yields the coefficient 
estimates of the outcome equation corrected for sample selection as well as the coefficients of 
the selection equation. If ρ is significant the two-step procedure must be used to estimate β, 
otherwise these estimates are biased due to sample selection. 
 
Table 4: Everyday jobs of respondents 
job Freq. Percent Cum. 
Worker/employee 12 2.4 2.4 
Official 61 12.2 14.6 
Farmer 325 65 79.6 
self-employed 75 15 94.6 
Trainee 1 0.2 94.8 
Housewife/-husband 1 0.2 95 
Retiree 25 5 100 
Total 500 100 
 
 
Table 5 shows the results of two alternative model specifications that differ only in the dummy 
variable for respondents' everyday occupation (OFFICIAL vs. FARMER), for which we control in 
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the selection model as well as in the outcome model. In our questionnaire we offered a choice of 
all in all seven different employment categories (worker/employee, government official, farmer, 
self-employed, trainee, housewife/househusband, retiree) from which respondents were asked 
to choose their personal type of employment. The most frequently chosen categories were 
farmers (65%), self-employed (15%) and officials (12.2%), as can be seen from table 4. Since 
farmers are used to doing hard work, while government officials are used to light work (for the 
other job categories this is not clear in general), we chose these two kinds of work as control 
variables for models 2 and 1, respectively. With these two regression models we wanted to 
scrutinize the influence of respondents' everyday occupation on their willingness to offer physical  
work contributions to the provision of the landslide protection program.  
In the two versions of the selection model shown in table 5 it turns out that the general readiness 
to participate in communal work for the landslide and flood protection program (dependent 
variable WOULDWORK) is significantly higher for respondents who have participated in 
communal work before (independent variable PUB_WORK), and that readiness to work is 
significantly lower for members of the Kinh ethnicity (ETHNIC). From Table 5 it can also be seen 
that (in model 1) respondents' age (AGE) has a negative impact on their willingness to do 
physical work, which seems quite plausible, while income (INCOME) has a positive effect on the 
basic readiness to provide work in both models. The latter result underlines our argument that 
the readiness to provide work does not necessarily follow from a tight budget constraint, which 
would make it impossible to express one's appreciation of a public project in terms of money. 
Instead, the readiness to work increases with income in both regressions. The decisive result in 
the sense of our hypothesis (H2) is that farmers' stated readiness to work is significantly higher 
than that of other professions (FARMER in model 2). This confirms our conviction that the 
occupational background of respondents influences their willingness to contribute physical work 
to the realization of a public project like flood and landslide protection significantly. Therefore, a 
workday in communal work is not the same workday for everyone.  
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Table 5: Explanatory model for willingness to work (Heckman two-step model) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Selection equation:    dependent variable WOULDWORK   (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
CONSTANT 0.230 0.796 -0.776 0.377 
SEVERE 0.040 0.798 0.056 0.739 
REPAIR_WORK 0.002 0.976 -0.025 0.757 
OFFICIAL -0.551 0.171 - - 
FARMER - - 1.122*** 0.002 
AGE -0.014* 0.099 -0.013 0.162 
EDU 0.006 0.955 0.033 0.759 
MALE 0.041 0.864 -0.007 0.978 
INCOME 0.231** 0.033 0.269*** 0.010 
COMPARE 0.103 0.675 0.102 0.695 
PUB_WORK 1.157*** 0.000 0.958*** 0.001 
ETHNIC -1.328*** 0.000 -0.819** 0.013 
Outcome equation:    dependent variable WTW    (number of working days offered) 
CONSTANT -0.178 0.921 -1.339 0.488 
HARD WORK -0.964** 0.023 -0.928** 0.030 
SEVERE -0.316 0.280 -0.317 0.281 
DAM_FARM 0.766* 0.074 0.671 0.136 
REPAIR_WORK 0.163 0.161 0.175 0.156 
OFFICIAL -1.656** 0.021 - - 
FARMER - - 1.557* 0.061 
AGE 0.036* 0.078 0.032 0.111 
EDU 0.473** 0.041 0.472** 0.036 
MALE 1.052*** 0.008 0.978** 0.026 
LAMBDA -1.242 0.250 0.234 0.878 
Wald χ2 (df = 8) 22.74 0.004 24.53 0.002 
Rho -0.312  0.059  
Sigma 3.978  3.948  
***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, respectively 
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In the lower part of table 5 containing the results of the outcome regression model for WTW 
contingent on the decision to contribute labour in principle, we see again that hypothesis (H1) is 
supported since the dummy variable HARD_WORK indicates that the hard work scenario has a 
significantly negative effect on WTW in both models. The results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test in table 6 show that there is no significant difference in the socio-demographic characteristics 
of the two split-samples of respondents confronted with the "hard work" scenario and the "light 
work" scenario, respectively. The fact that the number of working days (WTW) respondents of 
the two sub-samples offer to contribute to the same public project, i.e. landslide and flood 
protection, differs significantly according to the kind of labour they would have to do, again 
confirms our hypothesis (H1) that labour is not a homogenous indicator of utility. Since both sub-
samples consist of statistically identical respondent groups, we can assume that both groups 
would enjoy the same utility increase from the landslide and flood protection program. If working 
days were a uniform indicator of utility changes, both groups would, therefore, have to state the 
same average WTW for that program. This is not the case, as can be seen from both regression 
models in table 5, where the number of workdays offered in terms of the "hard work" currency is 
significantly lower than in terms of the "light work" currency. Therefore, working days (WTW) are 
not even for the same person a uniform currency to pay for one and the same utility increase.  
Further, our hypothesis (H2), i.e. that WTW depends on people’s everyday occupation, is also 
supported by the outcome regression model. Being a government official (OFFICIAL) has a 
significantly negative effect on WTW in model 1, while being a farmer (FARMER) has a positive 
effect on WTW in model 2. Since we control for the kind of work in the outcome model, this means 
that people with different professional backgrounds state significantly different numbers of days 
(WTW) of the same kind of work for the same public project. In other words, this shows that the 
same kind of work represents different "currencies" to pay for the same utility increase for 
different people, depending on their professional background.  
From the lower part of table 5 it can, further, be seen that WTW increases with the number of 
times a respondent's own farm has suffered damages from landslides or flooding (DAM_FARM 
in model 1), and that male respondents (MALE) are willing to contribute more working days than 
female respondents. Both results are more or less self-explanatory. It is interesting to see that 
the number of working days offered by those respondents who are ready to work in principle, 
increases with age and also with respondents' level of education.   
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Table 6: Frequencies and percentages regarding the opportunity cost of time 
If you contributed your personal working time, would that mean that 
you… 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
… lose money because you cannot perform any paid work during that 
time?  (option 1) 
36 7.59 7.59 
… get into difficulties with the work you have to do for your own business 
or farm because nobody else can do it for you? (option 2) 
311 65.61 73.21 
… forgo only leisure time because you have enough spare time to do 
some extra work? (option 3) 
127 26.79 100 
Total 474 100 
 
 
 
Our last hypothesis (H3) holds that it is not possible to determine the opportunity cost of the 
labour contributed to community work unambiguously, because the opportunity cost of the 
different working days are not known. In our questionnaire we asked respondents what the 
consequences of contributing work to the landslide and flood protection program would mean for 
their other activities: "If you contributed your personal working time [to that program], would that 
mean that you … (a) lose money because you cannot perform any paid work during that time, 
(b) get into difficulties with the work you have to do for your own business or farm because nobody 
else can do it for you, (c) forgo only leisure time because you have enough spare time to do some 
extra work?". These three possibilities correspond with our discussion of this problem in the 
context of the budget equations (6) above. From table 6 it can be seen that a majority of 65.61% 
of respondents would run into difficulties with the work in their own business or farm, 26.79% 
would lose leisure time and only 7.59% of respondents would lose the opportunity to do paid 
work. This shows that there is practically no functioning labour market where people have the 
possibility to earn some homogeneous wage rate. Therefore, it does not make sense to convert 
WTW contributions into monetary units by multiplying the hours of communal work by an average 
wage rate, since this wage rate does not capture the opportunity cost of the communal working 
hours. This opportunity cost consists partly of the opportunity cost of labour in respondents' own 
business and partly of the opportunity cost of leisure. Researchers conducting a CVM survey do 
not know what kind of alternative activity respondents would choose instead of working for the 
environmental project, so they cannot reasonably assess the monetary value of this work in terms 
of its opportunity cost.  
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Of course, in this context it will also play a role if respondents are free to choose the date when 
they join the public work by themselves or if they have to come whenever they are called. This is 
also one of the differences between our two working scenarios. "Hard work" requires respondents 
to come whenever they are needed, which might also happen during the seeding or harvesting 
period, while in the "Light work" scenario respondents can choose by themselves the date and 
time of their community work contribution. To compare the two splits we tested for differences in 
socio-demographic variables between the groups. No significant differences have been found 
(see table 7). 
 
Table 7: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for differences in socio-demographic variables 
between splits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, respectively  
 
As one might expect, respondents would run into difficulties with their own work (FARMDIFF) 
significantly more often under the "Hard work" conditions than under the "Light work" 
circumstances. Opportunity cost in terms of lost leisure time (LEISURE) would accrue 
significantly more often under the conditions of "Light work", where people can choose by 
themselves the date of their working contribution. There is no significant difference between 
"Hard work" and "Light work" with respect to a loss of paid work as an opportunity cost of 
community labour (NOPAY), since only very few people have the opportunity to conduct paid 
work at all in such regions, anyway. This can be seen from table 8. 
 
WMW test – Comparison of socio-demographics 
between “hard work” and “light work” splits 
  Hard work 
(n=199) 
Light work 
(n=201) 
p-value 
MALE 0.67 0.65 0.6377 
AGE 45.51 45.68 0.8997 
EDU 2.88 2.86 0.7946 
INCOME 5.56 5.66 0.3625 
CHILDREN 2.64 2.7 0.7664 
ETHNIC 0.29 0.33 0.3332 
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Table 8: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for differences in opportunity costs of contributed 
working time between work scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, respectively  
 
Summing up, our three hypotheses (H1) to (H3) implying the unsuitability of labour as a 
numeraire in CVM surveys are supported by the results of our empirical study. Using labour 
instead of money as a measuring rod for utility changes does not solve the problem, that the 
monetary WTP of very poor households for public projects might be restricted by their (in)ability 
to pay. On the contrary, new and more severe consistency problems would be created by 
following this suggestion.   
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we deal with the empirical problem that in Stated Preference studies in very poor 
countries or regions stated willingness to pay for environmental improvements is typically very 
low. This is a disadvantage for these regions, if government makes investments in environmental 
projects dependent on a comparison between the project costs and the social benefits accruing 
from such an investment. Of course, it is plausible, that if people live under austere material 
conditions they do not appreciate environmental improvements the same as people living in 
better circumstances.  
Nevertheless, it is often held that such people are not able to express their true appreciation of 
an environmental project adequately in terms of willingness to pay, because their WTP is limited 
by their ability to pay, i.e. by their budget constraint. Therefore, it is suggested to use working 
time people would be willing to contribute to the realization of an environmental project as an 
indicator of utility instead of money. In this paper we showed that people's willingness to work is 
unsuitable as a utility measure in Stated Preference studies, because of several theoretical and 
empirical inconsistencies. Based on a Contingent Valuation study conducted in northern Vietnam 
WMW test – Comparison of indicated opportunity 
costs between “hard work” and “light work” splits 
  Hard work Light work p-value 
NOPAY 0.076 0.068 0.7296 
FARMDIFF 0.696 *** 0.548  0.001 
LEISURE 0.172 0.336 *** 0.000 
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we showed that WTW is not a uniform or homogeneous payment vehicle for CVM studies, since 
its utility equivalent varies with the kind of labour that has to be provided by respondents of a 
CVM interview and also with the kind of labour these people are used to from their normal job. 
Labour contributions affect people's utility not only as a loss of leisure time but, differently from 
money, labour has also a direct impact on their wellbeing. While money expenditures cause 
disutility only by reducing the market consumption opportunities of individuals, labour 
contributions cause a reduction of opportunities to use the time differently (e.g. for paid work, 
work in one's own house or business, leisure time) and, additionally, they cause a direct utility 
loss by the inconvenience or pain caused by the work to be done, which depends on the specific 
kind of work that is required. These characteristics of voluntary work contributions to public 
projects make them inept as general utility measures in Stated Preference studies, since a 
working day will represent different alternative utility sacrifices for different people under different 
circumstances. This holds also for one and the same person, depending on the alternative uses 
of the time to be contributed, the kind of work to be done and the kind of work people are used 
to from their everyday lives. In our CVM study conducted in a rural area in northern Vietnam we 
proved these hypotheses also empirically.  
What is the consequence of these findings? In this study as well as in other CVM studies it 
showed that the monetary contributions stated as WTP for an environmental project amount only 
to a very small share of households' disposable incomes (0.08%), so that it cannot be reasonably 
assumed that people's stated WTP is seriously limited or truncated by their budget constraint. 
Therefore, the low WTP amounts for environmental projects stated in CVM surveys in poor 
regions might reflect people's true preferences, i.e. they might indeed desire material goods more 
than environmental improvements. If politicians and environmentalists think that, nevertheless, 
environmental projects should be conducted in these regions, because they consider themselves 
more farsighted than the local population, then they should simply conduct these programs on 
the grounds of their better judgement. Maybe cost-benefit analyses based on Stated Preference 
surveys are not suitable decision criteria for the realization of environmental projects in very poor 
areas, because local people's vision of the future is blurred by their short-run material needs and 
desires, so that the principles of sustainable development have to come from outside these 
areas. Changing the numeraire in Stated Preference studies in order to obtain the desired results 
does not solve the problem, as has been shown in this paper.   
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